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This paper investigates the extent to which loss-offset constraintsaffect
corporate tax incentives. Using data gathered from corporate annualreports, we
estimate that in 1984 fifteen percent of the firms in the nonfinancialcorporate
sector had tax loss carryforwards. When weighted by their market value, how—
ever, these firms account for less than three percent of this sector, suggesting
that loss carryforwards are concentratedamong small firms and affect relatively
few large corporations. For those firms with loss carryforwards,however, the
incentive effects of the corporate income taxmay differ significantly from
those facing taxable firms. We demonstrate this by calculating the effective
tax rates on equipment and structures for both types of firms. Our results
suggest that firms which are currently taxable have a substantially greater
incentive for equipment investment than firms with loss carryforwards, butthat
loss carryforwards have a relatively smaller effect on the tax incentive for
investing in structures. Overall, firms with loss carryforwards receive a
smaller investment stimulus than taxable firms.
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215—898—1503 617—253—6673The U.S. corporate income tax provides only limited tax reliefto firms
which report tax losses. Firms which have paidpositive taxes during the three
years prior to the loss year may "carry back" their losses and receivea tax
refund, provided it does not exceed their taxes in those threeyears. For some
firms, however, current losses exceed potentialcarrybacks. This may happen
when a firm experiences losses in several consecutiveyears, or when it incurs
an especially large loss in a single year. Firms which exhaust theirpotential
carrybacks must carry losses forward, using them to offset future taxableear-
nings. For these firms, the marginal tax rate on currentearnings as well as
the value of tax deductions depends criticallyupon when, and if, they regain
their taxable status. Firms which anticipate persistent losscarryforwards will
in effect face very low marginal tax rates.
Imperfect loss—offset provisions may substantially alter the incentive
effects of the corporate income tax. Two features of thetax, the incentive to
undertake new investment and the incentive to use debt asopposed to equity
finance, are particularly sensitive because loss carryforward firmsmay be
unable to claim the benefits of depreciation or interest tax shields.
Standard analyses o-f corporate investment incentives assume that firms
claim depreciation allowances and investment tax creditsas they accrue. For
firms with loss carryforwards, however, accrual and realizationoccur at dif-
ferent dates. This timing difference can change both the relativetax incent-
Ives for investments in plant and equipment, and the overall investmentincent-
ive facing the firm. For assets with high tax burdens,typically those with
long depreciation lives such as structures, a loss carryforward firmmay have a—2-
greater incentive to invest than a currently taxable firm.This occurs because
the 9am from postponing the tax payments on the asset's earnings exceeds the
loss from postponing its tax depreciation benefits. The opposite result may
obtain for assets with highly accelerated depreciation allowances, such as
equipment. For these assets, the cost of delayed realization of the depre—
ciation benefits may exceed the gain from deferring taxes on the project's pro-
fits, and loss carryforward firms may therefore face smaller investment incent-
ives than taxable firms.
Loss offset provisions may also exert an important influence on corporate
financing choices. Interest deductions are worth less to a loss-carryforward
firm than to a currently taxable firm, so a firm with a tax loss carryforward
has a smaller incentive to use debt finance than a currently taxable firm. In
addition, a firm's probability of experiencing future loss carryforwards may
depend upon its financial policy, since higher interest deductions lower taxable
profits and raise the chance of realizing losses. This has led some to propose
a theory of corporate capital structure based on the proposition that firms
borrow until the expected marginal cost of additional debt due to the increased
probability of becoming non-taxable and losing pre-existing tax shields equals
the expected marginal benefit of additional deductions when taxable. This
theory implies that tax systems with more generous loss-offset provisions pro-
vide a greater incentive for corporate borrowing.
Several recent studies have suggested that the loss-carryforward provisions
of corporate tax codes are of more than academic interest. Cordes and Sheffrin
(1983) analyzed the distribution of corporate marginal tax rates on additional
interest deductions, and estimated that only fifty-six percent of corporate—3-
receipts accrued to firms which paid the maximum statutory corporate tax rate on
marginal earnings. This is due to the combined effect of tax loss carryforwards
and binding income-linked constraints on the use of investment and foreign tax
credits.1 In Canada, Mintz (1985) reports that only half of the investment in
manufacturing is undertaken by currently-taxable firms, and the incidence of
loss—carryforward firms ismuchhigher in some other sectors, such as mining.
For Great Britain, Mayer (1986) cites evidence that during the early 1980s, only
forty percent of British companies were paying corporation tax on marginal pro-
fits. The stock of tax loss carryforwards in the U.K. was nearly three times as
large as the annual revenue yield of the corporation tax.
This paper presents new evidence on the importance of tax loss carryforwards
in the United States. It uses a new data set gathered from corporate annual
reports and 10-K forms to investigate the incidence of loss carryforwards, and
then examines how loss offset constraints affect effective tax rates on dif-
ferent assets. The most important finding is that tax loss carryforwards are
relatively unimportant in the U.S. corporate sector as a whole. Although nearly
fifteen percent of the firms in our sample had tax loss carryforwards in 1984,
when weighted by market value they accounted for only three percent of the
sample. Loss carryforward firms do, however, account for a significant fraction
of some industries. Analyzing the effect of the corporate income tax on tax-
loss firms is therefore essential to understanding investment and financing
incentives in these industries. We estimate the persistence of loss carryfor-
wards and use the results to calculate effective tax rates on new investments in
structures and industrial equipment for both currently—taxable and loss-carry-
forward firms. We find that the presence of a tax loss carryforward has a-4-
dramatic effect on a firm's incentive to invest in equipment, but it has
relatively little impact on the incentive to invest in structures.
The paper is divided into five sections. The first outlines the tax rules
governing loss carryforwards and carrybacks. It also explains the difficulties
which arise in using standard data sources to measure tax loss carryforwards,
and describes our new data set. The second section presents our basic findings
on the importance of firms with tax loss carryforwards, and examines the per-
sistence of loss carryforwards for the firms which experience them. Section
three outlines how loss offset constraints alter the effective tax rates on
various assets, and describes our numerical procedures. The fourth section pre-
sents our calculations of the effective tax rates on plant and equipment invest-
ment for both currently-taxable and loss-carryforward firms. A concluding
section discusses the implications of our results for understanding the alloca-
tive effects of the corporate income tax, and suggests a number of directions
for future work.—5-
1. The Def,nition and Measurement of Tax Loss Carryforwards
Loss offset constraints restrict a firm's ability to obtain tax refunds
when it generates negative taxable profits. A firm which realizesa tax loss
may carry the loss back against tax payments in the previous three years,pro-
vided it does not claim current refunds in excess of total taxpayments in those
years. Firms which have exhausted their carrybacks may carry unused losses for-
ward for a maximum of fifteen years, after which the lossesexpire and can no
longer be used to reduce tax liability. Prior to 1981, loss carryforwards
expired in five years. For firms with loss carryforwards, an additional dollar
of taxable income has no effect on current tax liability. Themarginal tax bur-
den on an additional dollar of taxable earnings dependsupon when the firm
becomes taxable again in the future.
It is important to distinguish between firms with loss carryforwards and
"firms that pay no taxes."2 A firm with a tax loss carryforward ina given
year pays no tax, but it may receive a refund if it can carry part of the loss
back against previous tax payments. A marginal change in the firm's taxable
earnings, however, will have no effect on its current tax liability. Its
current marginal tax rate is zero, although if it expects to exhaust its loss
carryforwards in the near future, it will face an effective marginal tax rate
which differs from the statutory tax rate only by the price of an interest free
loan for the duration of its remaining tax-loss period.
Not all firms with negative current tax payments have loss carry-forwards,
however. Some firms which are carrying-back current lossesmay not have ex-
huasted their carryback potential. For these firms, the marginal tax rateon—6-
additional income is the statutory tax rate, because an additional dollar of
earned income will reduce the amount of their carryback. These firms face the
statutory marginal rate even though their current tax payments are negative.
Loss carryforwards are not the only factor that may cause a firm's margi-
nal tax rate to differ from the statutory rate. Cordes and Sheffrin (1983)
explain how constraints on the use of tax credits and the corporate minimum tax
also affect the distribution of marginal corporate tax rates.3 Unfortunately,
publicly available information is not detailed enough to enable us to measure
the marginal tax rates facing individual corporations. This would require
information on each firm's current tax credits, its credit and loss carryfor-
wards, and even its previous tax payments to calculate its carryback potential.
These data can only be obtained from a firm's past and present tax returns,
which are confidential.4One type of tax data which can be gathered from pub-
lished sources is the identity of firms with tax loss carryforwards. Corporate
annual reports and 10-K filings typically contain some information on carryfor-
wards, so we focus on this source of variation in marginal corporate tax rates.
Data limitations prevent us from assessing the significance of firms with
tax credit carryforwards. Most of the firms which we identified as having tax
loss carryforwards also reported credit carryforwards.There may be other
firms, however, with credit carryforwards but no loss carryforwards; Cordes and
Sheffrin (1983) suggest that these credit carryforward firms account for a
substantial fraction of the firms facing marginal corporate tax rates below the
statutory levels. We implicitly assume that firms either encounter loss and
credit carryforwards simultaneously, or that they encounter neither. Future
work using tax return information could extend our analysis of effective tax—7-
rates to consider the possibility of separate credit constraints as well.
The standard source of machine-readable information on corporate accounts is
the COMPUSTAT data base compiled by the Standard and Poor's Corporation. Al-
though the data Set contains a company's tax loss carrryforward if the annual
report includes one, there are several serious problems with these data. First,
there are two distinct ways of calculating a firm's tax loss carryforward. One
is for tax purposes, the other is for financial reportingpurposes. One
important difference between the two is that in computing financial reporting
loss carryforwards, firms exclude depreciation allowances in excess ofstraight
line depreciation. Financial loss carryforwardsmay therefore be smaller than
tax loss carryforwards, because accounting profits are larger than taxable
profits. The two measures also differ in the treatment of discontinued
operations, write-offs, and many other activities. A firm which decides to
write down its investment in an unprofitable subsidiarymay book a substantial
loss but receive no tax benefits for the transaction, thereby leading financial
reporting losses to exceed tax purpose losses. The relevant measure for
analyzing corporate incentives is the tax purpose loss; unfortunately, if a
firm reports both tax and financial loss carryforwards, COMPUSTAT records the
financial purpose carryforward. This may lead to spurious classification of
firms. Second, COMPUSTAT aggregates foreign tax loss carryforwardsalong with
U.S. carryforwards. For multinational firms, the data may therefore providean
unreliable description of current tax status.
Firms with loss carryforwards typically report both financial and tax
purpose data in their annual reports or 10-K statements. These published data,
although not available in machine-readable form, provide the basis for our-8-
study. We began with the list of COMPUSTAT firms reporting loss carryforwards
for any of the fiscal years 1981-1984. We then consulted the annual reports for
each of these firms; when available, we recorded the tax purpose carryforward.
We also investigated all of the firms on COMPUSTAT with either negative federal
tax payments or zero investment tax credits. In some cases, we found that firms
with COMPUSTAT carryforwards did not have U.S. tax basis carryforwards; these
were reclassified as loss-free firms. In other cases, the firms reported only
one measure of their loss carryforward and did not indicate whether it was a tax
or financial number. These firms (of which there were very few) were deleted
from our sample. We also deleted all foreign-based firms before investigating
the pattern of loss carryforwards.5 Our data set includes 1425 firms, of whom
228 experienced tax loss carryforwards at some point between 1981 and 1984. The
total market value of the firms in our sample is roughly three quarters of the
total market value of the nonfinancial corporate sector.
There are several potential biases in our data sample which should be
recognized at the outset. First, COMPUSTAT does not include all of the cor-
porations which file tax returns; there were over three million such firms in
1982! The firms on COMPUSTAT are large, publicly traded firms. If losses tend
to be more prevalent among smaller or start—up firms, then we may understate the
number of firms with tax loss carryforwards. Second, the data set follows
COMPIJSTAT in including only firms which were active in 1984. Some corporations
which encountered tax loss carryforwards in earlier years may either have been
taken over or gone bankrupt, and the end-of-sample sampling rule imparts a clear
selection bias. This may cause us to understate the number of loss carryforward
firms in 1981 through 1983, although this bias is likely to be small given the-9-
relatively low rate of both bankruptcy and takeover for firms on the COMPUSTAT
tape. A third source of bias arises because not all firms with lossesmay
report them. Firms are required to report loss carryforwards only if they are
"aateriaP'; since some firms with small carryforwards may notappear as carry-
forward firms on COMPUSTAT, we may understate their importance. Ofcourse,
for these firms the tax consequences of the loss carryforward arelikelyto be
especially small.
A final problem with loss carryforward data gathered from annualreports
and 10-K filings is the divergence between the divisions of the firm whichare
included on its consolidated tax return and those which are includedon the
financial statements. For example, as Dworin (1985) explains, some firms donot
include their finance subsidiaries in their financial statements although for
tax purposes these subsidiaries are consolidated with the parent corporation.6
We may therefore classify a parent firm as having a tax loss carryforwardeven
though the total taxpaying entity has no carryforward. This problem is
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.The Importance and Persistence of Loss Carryforwards
This section uses our annual report data set for the post-1981 period, as
well as accounting-purpose loss carryforward data available on COMPUSTAT for a
longer sample period, to explore the economic significance of tax loss carry-
forwards. We ask how many firms have carryforwards, and then examine the per-
sistence of these losses.
21 The Importance of Loss-Carryforward Firms
Table 1 presents summary evidence on the importance of firms with tax loss
carryforwards in the years since 1981. It considers the total population of
nonfinancial firms, as well as some particular industries. The table shows that
although about fifteen percent of all firms are in the loss carryforward regime,
they are disproportionately small firms; when weighted by the value of their
outstanding common stock, only 2.4 percent of the firms (in 1984) show loss
carryforwards. Although equity-value weights are attractive because they are
market-determined and not subject to accounting biases, weighting firms this way
may bias our calculations against finding that loss carryforwards are statisti-
cally important. Declining profitability may drive a firm into a loss-carry-
forward position while also reducing its market value. To address this issue we
weighted firms by their 1984 net book assets, an alternative size measure. We
found that 5.9 percent of all assets were held by loss-carryforward firms;
while larger than our equity—based calculations, this still suggests the limited
Importance of loss carryforwards.
Table 1 also shows that there is substantial concentration of carryforward
firms in some industries. In the oil industry (SIC codes 1311 and 2911) for cx--12-
ample, nearly a quarter of the firms accounting for two percent of the common
stock had loss carryforwards in 1984. In 1982 and 1983, forty percent of the
firms accounting for about ten percent of the value of outstanding common stock
in SIC classification 3711, motor vehicles and car bodies, reported tax loss
carryforwards. In the steel industry, the findings suggest a third of the firms
have losses, and in this case, they are not small firms. The firms with loss
carryforwards account for half of industry's outstanding equity value. Finally,
for airlines we also find a high incidence of loss carryforwards: forty percent
of the firms, accounting for roughly one tenth of the industry's equity value.
Table 2 shows the total value of the loss carryforwards for the firms in
our sample. These carryforwards aggregated to 5.1 billion dollars in 1981, 10.0
billion in 1982, 15.1 dollars in 1983, and 12.8 billion dollars in 1984, These
carryforwards can be compared to corporate tax receipts of roughly sixty billion
dollars in 1984. The U.S. stock of carryforwards is therefore small relative to
that in either the U.K. or Canada. The center panel in Table 2 relates the
value of the tax loss carryforwards to the market value of the affected firms.
In 1984, the nominal value of the carryforwards equalled forty—eight percent of
the firms with these carryforwards. In some industries, notably steel, autos,
and airlines, tax loss carryforwards actually exceed the equity value of the
loss-carryforward firms. The bottom panel of Table 2 relates the value of loss
carryforwards to the market value of all firms in particular industries. In
steel, carryforwards are eighty percent as large as the outstanding market value
of the industry. The comparable statistic is twenty—eight percent in airlines,
but below five percent in the other industries we consider.
To provide additional perspective on the problem of loss-carryforward firms,-13-
TABLE 2: ESTIMATES OF TAX LOSS CARRYFORWARDS, 1981-1984
Industry ____ ____ ____ 1984
All Nonfinancial
Corporations 5070.]. 10000.8 15083.6 12841.7*
011 45.7 129.4 1353.3 1291.3
Autos 2278.7 2407.0 2853.0 1262.0
Steel 96.8 1274.0 2389.1 3808.3
Airlines 568.5 1054.1 2197.8 2171.5
Tax Loss Carryforwards as














Notes: Calculations are based on the authors' data set consisting of 1425 firms.
Tabulations for 1984 exclude the Penn Central Company, for which no data
were available. See text for further details.
























Table3 displays the twenty largest loss-carryforward firms in our sample,
measured by equity value, with their tax loss carryforwards for 1983. The
table depicts the same industry concentrations described above: the twenty
firms include three railroads, four auto or heavy machinery manufacturers, four
steel companies, and two copper companies. Although most firms on the list
experienced tax losses because of poor profit performance, some firms (Storer
Communications and Turner Broadcasting, for example) appear because substantial
investment programs generated depreciation allowances significantly greater than
taxable earnings from current operations.
2.2 The Persistence of Tax Loss Carryforwards
The extent to which the restricted loss—offset provisions in the corpor-
ation tax affect investment and financing incentives depends upon the duration
of non-taxable spells. If firms with loss carryforwards can expect to recover
their taxable status within a year or two, then the absence of loss offset pro-
visions will have relatively little effect on incentives. If firms with carry-
forwards tend to be constrained for many years, however, then they may face
incentive effects which are substantially different from those of taxable firms.
We adopt two different approaches to analyzing the persistence of tax loss
carryforwards. First, we use our data for the last four years to fit simple
$arkov models for transitions into and out of the loss carryforward state. This
provides the basis for our analysis of effective tax rates in later sections,
but it is limited by the fact that our data span a period of only four years.
Moreover, since these years include a very deep recession, transition probabili-
ties from the recent period may be unrepresentative of those confronting firms-15-
TABLE 3: THE TAX LOSS CARRYFORWARO TOP TWENTY, 1983
Equity Value Tax Loss
Firm Name 1$million) Carryforward
1. Burlington Northern 3677.8 405.1
2. Chrysler Corporation 3365.0 1600.0
3. U.S. Steel 3178.4 1200.0
4. General Dynamics 3064.4 137.3
5. Syntex Corporation 1799.7 110.0
6. Bethlehem Steel 1318.1 682.3
7. Penn Central 1164.0 2097.4
8. LIV Corporation 1017.6 630.0
9. IC Industries 799.1 126.3
10. Asarco Inc. 775.6 12.4
11. Inland Steel 771.8 466.1
12. Phelps Dodge Corp. 622.2 380.0
13. Storer Communication 612.7 39.8
14. Clark Equipment 560.2 44.0
15. Datapoint Corporation 552.8 4,2
16. AIleghany Corporation 524.9 unknown
17. American Motors 514.0 257.0
18. Turner Broadcasting 484.2 17.3
19. Best Products 478.1 1.0
20. International Harvester 466.7 996.0
Notes: Firms are ranked by outstanding equity value at the end of 1983. The
Alleghany Corporation reported the presence of tax-purpose loss carry-
forwards, but it did not report their amount.—16-
over a longer horizon. To obtain information on long-term persistence of loss
carryforwards, we therefore perform the same calculations using a second data
source, the partially contaminated accounting loss carryforward data from
COMPUSTAT, for the period 1968-1984. These data are also used to construct
empirical distributions of the number of firms with losses which persisted for
one year, two years, three years, etc. Although the differences between tax and
book loss carryforwards make these tabulations an imperfect source of
information on persistence, they do permit us to compare the recent experience
with that in prior years.
Table 4 reports summary statistics, based on our post-1981 data sample, for
transitions into and out of loss-carryforward status. The top panel shows pro-
babilities based on the first-order Markov assumption, i.e. treating a firm's
current status as containing all relevant information about it's transition
prospects. These estimates show that for the 1983-1984 period, the probability
that a firm which did not experience a loss carryforward in period t would
experience one in period t +1is .026. For a firm with a loss carryforward in
period t, the probability of remaining in the loss-carryforward state at t +1
is .913.
In calculating simple Markov probabilities, we are implicitly assuming
that all firms have identical transition probabilities and that these probabil-
ities did not vary between 1983 and 1984. Neither assumption is realistic, and
these results should therefore be regarded as a simple way of summarizing the
data rather than as parameters of a structural model of transition behavior.
There are two significant reasons why the transition probabilities are
likely to vary across firms: different firms have loss carryforwards of dif--17-
TABLE 4: TAX STATUS TRANSITION PROBABILITIES
FIRST ORDER MARKOV MODEL
Probability of Moving to State of
Previous State No Loss Carryforward Loss Carryforward
No Loss Carryforward .974 .026
Loss Carryforward .087 .913
SECOND ORDER MARKOV MODEL
State in Period t +1:
Previous State No Loss Carryforward LossCarryforward
No Loss Carryforward (t-1)
No Loss Carryfroward (t) .977 .023
No Loss Carryforward (t-1)
Loss Carryforward (t) .099 .901
Loss Carryforward (t-1)
No Loss Carryforward (t) .680 .320
Loss Carryforward (t-1)
Loss Carryforward (t) .083 .917
Notes: All calculations are based on the authors' dataset, described in the text,
which yields 2849 firm-years of data. The estimatesare for transitions
observed in 1983 and 1984.- 18-
ferentsizes, and there are probably differences in the stochastic processes
driving their taxable income streams. Auerbach (1983) estimated a model for tax
status in which the firms' tax loss carryforward was modelled as a continuous
variable. This requires imputing potential carrybacks to firms with no loss
carryforwards, and it also necessitates complicated numerical integration in
evaluating effective tax rates. The Markov model used here yields great
simplification in computing tax incentives. Both procedures may be sensitive to
missing information about the vintages of carryforwards, since two firms with
loss carryforwards of identical size, one whose losses were generated fifteen
years ago and the other whose losses were generated last year, have radically
The second source of heterogeneity, potential differences in profit
processes, is more difficult to treat because it invalidates our assumption of a
simple Markov process. A firm's characteristics, and potentially lagged values
of its loss carryforward status, may affect its transition probability.8 We
introduce some additional flexibility in our transition matrix by estimating a
second-order Markov process.
The results of estimating the second-order process are shown in the second
panel of Table 4. We tested the assumption of a first-order Markov process
against the alternative of a second-order process (see Anderson and Goodman
(1957)) and rejected the first-order assumption at the .10 level but not the .05
level. The x2(2) statistic was 5.02, with a .05 critical value of 5.99. We use
the second-order process in later sections to calculate effective tax rates.
Two important conclusions emerge from Table 4. First, it is very unlikely
for a firm without a tax loss carryforward to incur one. Second, it is also
unlikely for a firm with a tax loss carryforward to "escape" and become taxable—19-
again. These findings are important, because theysuggest that the burden of
the tax code's asymmetry is not borneuniformly, but rather falls heavily on the
relatively few firms with tax loss carryforwards. This alsoimplies that stand-
ard calculations of effective tax rates whichneglect the role of loss
carryforwards may conceal important interfirm variations intax incentives.
The most significant drawback of ourpost-1981 data is that we cannot exa-
mine the long-term persistence of tax losscarryforwards. We can address this
issue using the data on accounting tax losscarryforwards drawn from the
COMPUSTAT tape, however. To evaluate thepotential biases associated with these
data, we compared their second-order Markov transitionprobabilities for the
1983-1984 period with those obtained from our annualreports data. The probabi-
lity that a firm with two previous years of losscarryforward would remain in
the loss carryforward state was .928 in the COMPUSTATdata, compared with .917
in the annual reports data. Theprobability of remaining carryforward-free
after two years of being currently taxablewas .966 rather than .977. The
COMPUSTAT data therefore probably overstate thepersistence of tax losses
because the chances of experiencing a tax loss ina given year, for both firms
which have and have not experienced them in thepast, are higher in these data.
This is consistent with our finding that financialpurpose loss carryforwards,
because they include asset write-offs and otherlosses, may appear more
significant than the comparable tax—purpose losses.Nonetheless, the close
agreement between the COMPUSTAT and annual report-based datasuggest that
valuable information can be obtained bystudying COMPUSTAT transition
probabilities over time..-
Table 5 presents the pattern of transition probabilitiesfrom the COMPUSTATTABLE 5: TAX
-20-
STATUS TRANSITION PROBABILITIES ESTIMATED FROM COMPUSTAT SAMPLE
Year TTL TLL LTL LLL
1968 .034 .533 .000 .758
1969 .024 .840 .067 .800
1970 .030 .700 .267 .702
1971 .045 .889 .129 .895
1972 .021 .800 .000 .822
1973 .022 .773 .133 .778
1974 .035 .760 .108 .802
1975 .020 .900 .069 .798
1976 .018 .696 .033 .734
1977 .026 .850 .087 .786
1978 .015 .849 .036 .793
1979 .016 .647 .167 .709
1980 .015 .696 .119 .894
1981 .020 .727 .050 .921
1982 .047 .963 .167 .920
1983 .034 .923 .000 .941
1984 .036 .950 .231 .926
1968-1984 .027 .825 .103 .830
1968-1980 .024 .787 .102 .789
1981-1984 .034 .909 .113 .928
Means:
Notes: Each column reports the transition probabilities calculated from the
COMPUSTAT data set of financial purpose tax loss carryforwards.-21-
sample.It reports our estimates of the four basic transition rates foreach
year between 1968 and 1984, as well as the probabilities for the fullsample
period and two subsamples. Two Conclusions emerge. First, theprobability that
a firm with loss carryforwards in the two previousyears will experience another
year of tax loss increased substantially in 1981. We denote thisprobability as
LLL' where the subscripts refer to the tax status -inperiodst—2, t-1, and t,
respectively. The Subscript takes the value L for loss carryforward, and T for
currently taxable. The probability LLL' which never exceeded .90 in theyears
prior to 1980 and which was frequently below .80,averages .928 since 1981. The
probability of remaining in the loss position rises between 1981 and 1983, then
declines in 1984, reflecting in part changing businesscycle conditions. There
is also a discontinuity in 1981 in the probability thata firm which has
experienced a taxable year followed by a loss year will remain in the loss
state, TLL in our notation. From a pre-1981 average of .787, theparameter
changes to a post-1981 value of .909.
The table also shows a substantial post-1981 increase in theprobability
that a taxable firm will experience a loss carryforward. From .024 before1981,
TLL increased by nearly forty percent to .034. There is a smaller increase in
the chance that a firm which has experienced a loss carryforwardyear followed
by a taxable year will re-enter loss status. These movements in the Markov
transition probabilities correspond to changes in the steady state distribution
of firms with respect to tax status. The pre-1981 probabilitiesimply that in
the steady state, 10.9 percent of all firms have tax losscarryforwards. The
comparable steady-state value for the post-1981 probabilities is 33.5 percent, a
striking increase.9 This undoubtedly overstates the long-run effect of the 1981-22-
tax reform,since itisdifficult to disentangle the effects of the 1981 tax
reform from the post-1981 recession.
Our estimates of second-order Markov transition rates are incomplete
because they shed no light on the behavior of firms which have experienced
losses for many periods. One way to study this long-term persistence is by cal-
culating the probability that a firm with a loss in a particular year will
experience losses for one more year, two more years, etc. Table 6 presents
calculations of these long-term transition rates from the COMPUSTAT data sample
for the period 1974_1983.b0 The table shows that a significant fraction of firms
which experience tax losses in a given year will continue to have such losses
for at least four more years. The probability of this much persistence has
also risen over time, from .32 in 1974 to .50 in 1980, the last year for which
it is possible to calculate the four—year—later transition rate.
The estimates presented in this section are at best a rough characterizat-
ion of the transition probabilities confronting firms. In the next two sec—
tions, we calculate effective tax rates for hypothetical firms whose movements
into and out of the tax loss state are given by our estimates. This analysis,
which is primarily illustrative, demonstrates the potentially important effect

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.The Incentive to Invest in the Presence of Tax Losses
Unlike more direct forms of investment subsidy, tax loss carryforwards are
likely to affect different firms and asset types differently. A firm with
substantial unused tax benefits may appropriately view itself as temporarily
"tax exempt," while a firm with a small carryforward which it expects to utilize
during the next year regardless of its current decisions should take no account
of it in making investment decisions. The differences across asset type stem
from differences in the timing of taxable income. Many assets, such as equip-
ment under current law, may be expected to generate negative taxable income in
their initial years. If a firm has unused tax benefits when the project begins,
this will decrease the asset's after-tax income. Since the accruing losses must
be carried forward until the firm achieves a positive tax liability, some
investments may actually be discouraged by the presence of unused tax benefits.11
This section describes our methodology for quantifying these incentive effects.
There are a number of approaches to measuring the impact of tax law asym-
metries on investment incentives. Ideally, one would specify a dynamic model of
firm value maximization in which risky investment would be affected by, and in
turn would affect, the magnitude of unused tax benefits present at different
dates in different states of nature. This problem is complicated by the joint
endogeneity of investment and the firm's tax status.12 To make the problem more
tractable, if less general, one may restrict the endogeneity of either the
firm's investment behavior or its tax status. The former approach is taken by
Majd and Myers (1985,1986). They value the tax payments associated with risky
projects, taking account of the project's impact on the firm's future tax sta-—25-
tus.Their approach highlights the interaction between the project's risk and
the risk of other random changes in the firm's tax status, but it ignorespoten-
tial changes in corporate behavior which may result from variation in taxstatus.
An alternative approach, the one taken here, assumes that the probability
distribution of future tax status is determined by the firm's history alone.
This can be interpreted as treating the marginal investment project as small
relative to the rest of the firm, so that the firm's tax status is determinedby
the stochastic returns on its prior investments. The assumption that theproba—
bility distribution of tax status is invariant with respect to marginal decis-
ions is justified if this distribution is the direct result of firm optimization
decisions. This interpretation highlights one of this approach's shortcomings,
however, in that it is necessarily restricted to partial equilibrium analysis of
changes in tax rules or other components of the economic environment. We cannot
predict how a change in tax regime would affect the incentive to invest, since
it could both change the firm's statutory tax benefits holding its investment
decisions fixed and alter the probability distribution of its future tax status.
3.1. Effective Tax Rates with Loss Offset Limits
The summary statistic used throughout our analysis is the effective tax
rate on a marginal investment project, calculated as the percentage difference
between the internal rates of return on expected cash flows before and after
tax. We assume that these marginal investments are inherently risk-free, and
that the only source of uncertainty is the time profile of future tax payments.
We designate the project's before-tax rate of return as p, which is set equal to
.06 in all calculations. The asset depreciates at a constant rate, 5, so an-26-.
investmentmade at the beginnng of period 0 yields a gross return in period t
of (p +o)(l_a)t1per dollar of initial investment.
We assume that the investment tax credit and the first half-year depreciat-
ion allowance accrue at date 0. Thus, the firm's project-specific accrued tax





where Tisthe corporate tax rate, k the investment tax credit, Dt is the nomi-
nal date t depreciation allowance, and i is the inflation rate. These express-
ions describe an equity-financed project; with debt finance, interest deduct-
ions would also enter the formula for Bt.
Under a symmetric tax system with full loss offset, equation (1) would
describe actual tax payments. The project's after-tax internal rate of return,
r, would be defined implicitly by the expression:
(2) -B0 +ti(l+
t(4616)tl -B]ti(l+tt+(lo)tl) -T(r)=1
where T(r) denotes the present value of tax payments computed using discount
rate r.After simplification, equation (2) yields the more familiar user cost
of capital expression:
(3) p +6=(r+ö)(1—k—Tz)/(1-T).-27-
Weuse z to denote the present value of depreciation allowances discounted at r.
The value of r which solves (2) is used to define the effective tax rate:
(4) ETR =(p-r)/p
which is just the difference between pre-tax and post—tax rate of return,
measured as a fraction of the pretax return.
When the tax system imposes limitations on the deduction of losses, actual
tax payments may differ from Bt. This requires us to amend equation (2) before
r and the effective tax rate can be calculated. Each accrued tax liability
gives rise to a distribution of expected tax payments, since the firm may not be
taxable when the tax liability or benefit accrues. In some states of nature,
the firm will be taxable in period t and the accruing tax,B. can then be
realized immediately. If the firm has a tax loss carryforward andBt is posi-
tive, its loss carryforward will be reduced and the firm will experience an
increase in its tax payments in the year when it exhausts its carryforward and
becomes taxable. If Bt is negative, loss carryforwards will increase and there
will be a reduction in the firm's tax payments in the (future) year when the
firm begins paying taxes again.
To describe the distribution of tax payments corresponding to a tax accrual
in period t, we need some notation. We define1rLST to be the probability that a
firm with a loss carryforward in year t returns to being taxable in year t +s.
The subscripts denote the firm's tax status in the years beginning in year t, and
a T subscript indicates a taxable year while an L indicates a year with a loss
carryforward.13 Thus, is the probability that a firm with a loss carryforward
in year t will become taxable in the next year. BothLLT and iiL2T represent
the probability that a firm with loss a carryforward in period t will remain non--28-
taxable for one more period, and then return to current taxable status two
periods in the future. These probabilities, which we will ultimately derive
from our Markov transition parameters, enable us to compute the expected tax
payments corresponding to a tax accrual in period t.
Our analysis so far has omitted two important features of the tax system.
First, since there are limits on the number of years (N) an accrued tax payment
can be carried forward, the distribution of tax payments from an accrual at t
will be truncated after t +N.Second, we have ignored the role of loss carry-
backs. Once carrybacks are permitted, each expected tax payment increases the
firm's potential ability to subsequently carry back future tax losses. We will
use v.1 to denote the shadow value of additional tax payments in year t + s,
viewed from the perspective of year t. With these complications, the present
expected value of tax payments, 1, becomes
(5) T(r) =to5t(h)t[(1-1)SLST('tSfl
The term in brackets is the expected present value of a one dollar tax accrual
in period t. Equation (5) defines 1(r), which can in turn be substituted into
(2) to compute effective tax rates based on expected tax payments.14
3.2. ComputinQ the Time Distribution of Tax Payments
To implement these effective tax rate calculations, we need the probability
distribution of tax payment dates for each accrued tax liability. We compute
these distributions from the second order transition probabilities in Tables 5
and 6. These calculations are facilitated if we introduce new variables corres--29-
ponding to the probability that a firm is in each of the four possible states,
TI, TL, LI, and LL, in a given period. We use q. to represent these probabi-
lities. For a firm which is known to have a tax loss in the period before, and
period of, a new project investment, q =Iand =q
=q
=0. In gen-
eral, the probability that a firm will be taxable in period one is
(6) ir =LT
+ = + + +
Thesecond part of the equation shows how the year one probabilities can be
built up recursively from the starting conditions, the q°, and the transition
probabilities which were discussed in the last section. Similar calculations
permit us to derive the probabilities of finding the firm in other tax states in
period one.
The probability that the firm will carry its taxes from the investmentyear
forward exactly one period is ir1 = + Parallel calculations
show that the unconditional probability of carrying taxes forward for twoyears
or more is LL = + and the probability of carrying a loss for-
ward for exactly two years isLLT =LLTLLProbabilities corresponding to
longer carryforwards can also be calculated recursively.
While these calculations have considered the distribution of tax accruals
from period zero, it is straightforward to apply this approach to compute the
distribution of tax payments corresponding to accruals later in the project1s
life. The initial conditions are just the {qt•} corresponding to the firm's
probabilities of being in each tax state at the beginning of period t.These
can be calculated recursively from the {q9.} and the transition probabilities as
in equation (6). As we iterate forward, however, the firm's tax status in year
zero becomes less important as a predictor of its period t status and the itvec--30-
tor converges to a steady state value. In practice, we truncate our calculated
r vector after twenty elements and let the twenty-first element capture all of
the remaining probability.15
We incorporate loss carryforwards by assuming that all deferred tax
payments may be carried forward N years, where N is the statutory maximum f or
carrying losses forward.16Incorporating carrybacks is more complicated, since
the opportunity to carry losses back has the effect of making every tax payment
potentially valuable in facilitating the accelerated deduction of future tax
losses. This imparts a shadow value to tax payments; we calculate this shadow
value in two stages. First, we compute a distribution of expected tax payments
under the assumption that there are no carrybacks. Then, we account for carry-
backs by reducing each dollar of estimated tax payments by a shadow value which
depends upon the firm's current tax status and the estimated transition probabi-
lities. The calculation of the carryback shadow value is described in greater
detail in the Appendix.
3.3. Qualifications
All of the analysis in this section presumes that the effective tax rates
which apply to a firm's investment choices are a function of its own tax status.
This need not be the case. Leasing arrangements are one example of a channel
through which the effective tax rates of the firms using and owning an asset can
be separated. These institutions have been particularly popular in some of the
Industries with a significant incidence of tax losses, such as airlines. It is
important to realize however that although leasing can reduce the present value
of tax payments for a èonstrained firm, its impact on the firm's incentive to—31-
invest in new capital is less clear. A firm which has a loss carryforward would
be better off if it could utilize this tax benefit right away, since it the
associated tax benefit loses value over time and may expire. Given that the
firm cannot use this tax benefit, however, it may be encouraged to invest more,
since additional taxable income generated by new investment will enable it to
offset part of the loss carryforward.
A second limitation inherent to our analysis is its exclusive focus on tax
policies. For some of the large firms who have tax loss carryforwards, taxation
is just one of the many ways in which the goverment and the firm interact.
Examples of other policies which clearly affect the performance of the firms and
the welfare of their shareholders include direct loan guarantees, regulation
(especially for airlines and railroads), tariff policy, and in some cases
(such as General Dynamics) goverment purchasing policy. Analyzing changes in
tax rules without considering the offsetting changes which might occur in the
other policy instruments is therefore necessarily incomplete.—32-
4.Empirical Results
This section presents numerical calculations illustrating how tax losses
affect investment incentives. We consider general industrial equipment and
industrial buildings, and estimate the effective tax rates associated with each
under the tax regimes of 1965, 1975, and 1985. We then explore the sensitivity
of these tax rates under current law to changes in both the tax code and the
economic environment.
4.1. Changes in Effective Tax Rates Over Time
In 1965, the corporate tax rate was .48 and the investment tax credit,
which was available only on equipment, was 0.07 with no basis adjustment. The
equipment class could be written off over twelve years using the double-
declining balance method with an optimal switch to straight-line, while struc-
tures received the same treatment over twenty-nine years. Tax losses could be
carried forward for five years and back for three.
By 1975, the ITC on equipment had been raised to 0.10 and, due to the
introduction of the Asset Depreciation Range System, equipment could be written
off in ten years. In addition, structures had been restricted to using the 150
percent declining balance method. The corporate tax rate was still .48, and the
carryforward and carryback provisions were the same as those in 1965.
Through tax changes in 1978, 1981, 1982, 1984, and 1985, equipment now
receives a 10 percent ITC with 50 percent basis adjustment and depreciation over
five years following the pattern established by the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS). Structures may be written off over 19 years using the 175 per-
cent declining balance method with switchover to straight line. In 1981, the-33-
carryforwardperiod for losses was increased to fifteen years. Thestatutory
corporate tax rate in 1985 was .46.17
We estimate the pattern of before-tax cash flows for eachasset assuming
that the before-tax rate of return, net of depreciation, is sixpercent and that
the asset depreciates at the rate estimated by Hulten andWykoff (1981): 3.61
percent per year for buildings, 12.25 percent per year for equipment. We set
the inflation rate at four percent throughout ourcalculations, and use a real
discount rate of .03 to compute the shadow values ofpotential carrybacks.18
A firm's tax burden is critically dependent on the vector ofprobabilities
describing the number of years which will elapse before its firstpassage into
currently-taxable status. Using the transition probabilities estimated for the
COMPUSTAT sample in the 1968-1984 period, we calculate this vector fortwo
hypothetical firms. The first has just experienced its second consecutiveyear
of tax losses (q =1),while the second is "the representative firm" in the
sense that it has probabilities of being in states LL, LI, TL, and TT
corresponding to the Markov process' steady state.
Table 7 shows the itvectorsfor each of these firms. The itvectorreports
the probability that each firm will experience tax loss spells of different
lengths. The low probability of switching states leadsvery little of the
representative firm's weight to be in states IL or LT. In the steady state,
83.2 percent of firms are taxable in both the current and theprevious year,
while 12.1 percent of firms have had tax loss carryforwards in bothyears.
Alternatively, roughly 85 percent of all accrued tax payments will accrue to
firms which can deduct them immediately.19 Firms which are non-taxable remain
non-taxable for long periods, however. A firm with tax losses in the previous-34-
TABLE 7: DISTRIBUTIONS OF YEARS UNTIL FIRST PASSAGE INTO TAXABLE STATUS
Number of Years Firm with Loss
Until Currently Carryforward in Representative
Taxable Periods t and t—1 Firm





















Notes: All calculations are based on average transition probabilities from the
f1l sample 1968-1984 COMPUSTAT data file. The first column reports the
itvectorfor a firm which reports a tax loss carryorward in periods
t and t-1. The second column shows the analogous ir vector for a firm
which has the steady—state probabilities of being in each state:
TI with 82.9 probability, TL and LI each with 2.5 probability, and
LL with 12.1% probability. See text for further details.—35-
two years is more likely than not to wait at least four years until paying a
currently accruing tax liability.
Table 8 presents our effective tax rate calculations for the years 1965,
1975, and 1985 based on the assumption that each asset is entirely equity-
financed. The table shows the general trend toward reduced effective tax rates
on equipment over this time period, with the ETR for a taxable firm falling from
27.5 percent in 1965 to —5.0 percent in1985.The dramatic reductions in the
ETRs for taxable firms are however not reflected in the ETRs for tax loss carry-
forward firms, where the reduction is from 30.8 percent in 1965 to 15.0 percent
in 1985. For structures, the differences between taxable firms and loss-carry-
forward firms are much smaller. This is of course due to the much longer life-
time of these assets, and the consequent tendency for initial differences in tax
status to be damped out over the project horizon.20
The effect of asymmetric treatment of gains and losses on effective tax
rates is ambiguous, as noted in Auerbach (1983). Having a loss postpones all
tax liabilities, but especially the earliest ones which may be negative. The
latter effect is most important for equipment, where the currently taxable firm
faces a much lower effective tax rate than the loss-carryforward firm. The
impact on structures, for which immediate tax benefits are smaller, is in the
opposite direction.
The results also confirm the common view that tax losses prevent firms from
receiving the full incentive to invest intended by increases in accelerated
depreciation and the investment tax credit over recent years. While holding
inflation at four percent the hypothetical firm under symmetric taxation had its
effective tax rate on equipment reduced by 33.4 percentage points in the last—36-
TABLE 8: INVESTMENT INCENTIVES MEASURED BY EFFECTIVE TAX RATES
General Industrial Equipment
Firm Type 1965 Law 1975 Law 1985 Law
Loss Carry-
forwards at 30.8 24.2 15.0
t and t-1
Taxable at
t and t—1 27.5 9.2 -5.0
Firm Facing
Perfect Loss 34.2 15.8 0.8
Offset Code
Industrial Buildings
Firm Type 1965 Law 1975 Law 1985 Law
Loss Carry—
forwards at 42.5 45.0 39.2
t and t-1
Taxable at
t and t—1 49.2 53.3 42.5
Firm Facing
Perfect Loss 56.7 60.8 48.8
Offset Code
Notes: All calculations assume an inflation rate of .04 and a pretax
return to capital of .06. For equipment, o =.1225and for
structures, 6 =.0361.We employ the 1968-1984 transition
probabilities from Table 5.—37—
twodecades. The taxable firm enjoyed a similar decline of 32.5percentage
points, but the reduction was just 15.8 percentage points for thenontaxable
firm. It therefore received less than half of the fullstatutory benefit.
Our earlier results suggesting the high concentration oftax loss firms in
a few industries also indicate that previous estimates of effectivetax rates by
industry21 may be misleading. For steel, airlines, andautomobiles, for example,
it is essential to recognize that a substantial fraction offirms have tax loss
carryforwards and therefore face effective tax rates different from thosefacing
taxable firms. In these industries, there are alsolikely to be important
interfirm differences in effective tax rates due to variation incorporate
histories and tax status.
Our algorithm also computes the shadow value ofcarrybacks and the value of
a dollar of accruing tax losses for a firm which has just entered theuntaxed
state. For 1965 and 1975, when the carryforward period was fiveyears, the sha-
dow value of a carryback to a firm which had been taxable fortwo years was
.040; for a firm which had been nontaxable intheprevious year and was taxable
in the current year, this value was .072. The expectedpresent value of a
dollar of currently accruing losses to a firm which hadjust incurred a tax loss
carryforward for the first time was .479 dollars. In 1985, with the longer
period for carrying losses forward, these three parameters wererespectively
.026, .044, and .661.
The magnitude of the carryback shadow values suggest the limited usefulness
of current carryback provisions. This is because most lossesaccrue to firms
which experience several years of losses, and because most future losseswill be
recovered through the carryforward provision. Allowing firms theoption of-38-
carrying losses back typically accelerates the recognition of tax benefits,but
does not enable the firm to claim tax benefits which would otherwise have
expired unused. By contrast, the length of carryforward provision does appear
to have a substantial effect on the expected value of a dollar of accruing tax
losses. The longer carryforward period in 1985 both raises the value of a
marginal dollar of carryforwards, and lowers the value of the carrybackssince
accelerating the recovery of a tax loss is less critical with the expiration
constraint relaxed.
4.2. Sensitivity of Effective Tax Rates
Our results in Table 8 may actually underestimate the dispersion of effec-
tive tax rates facing corporations. Table 9 presents calculations for a number
of alternative assumptions about economic conditions, corporate behavior, and
tax policy. The second row of each panel shows the effect of an inflation
shock which raises the inflation rate from .04 to .10. This causes a large jump
inallof the calculated effective tax rates, the largest for taxable firms
investing in equipment. The effective tax rate rises by more in each case for
currently taxable than for non-taxable firms. This is because loss-carryforward
firms are already receiving their depreciation allowances at later dates than
currently taxable firms. This reduces the contribution of the depreciation
allowances to the project's present value, and hence lowers the sensitivity of
the effective tax rate to inflation shocks which further erode the value of
these allowances.
The third row of each panel shows the effective corporate tax rate, net of
interest deductions, when investments support real interest payments equal to a-39—
TABLE 9: SENSITIVITY OF EFFECTIVE TAX RATES TO ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS
Estimates Using Transition Probabilities from COMPUSTAT Data Sample
Firm with Loss Firm which is Hypothetical
Carryforward in Taxable in Firm Facing Per-
Assumption Periods t & t-1 Periods t & t-]. fect Loss Offset
General Industrial Equipment
Base Case 15.0 -5.0 0.8
Inflation =.10 26.7 9.2 19.2
Real Interest
Payments =.10* 5.0 -20.0 -15.8
(Pretax Returns)
Unlimited
Carryforwards 14.2 —5.0 0.8
Elimination of
Carrybacks 15.8 -5.8 0.8
Industrial Buildings
Base Case 39.2 42.5 48.3
Inflation =.10 44.2 51.7 60.8
Real Interest
Payments =.10* 28.3 30.0 34.2
(Pretax Returns)
Unlimited
Carryforwards 39.2 42.5 48.3
Elimination of
Carrybacks 40.8 43.3 48.3
Notes: The baseline case corresponds to the 1985 law in Table 8. Maintained
assumptions are the same as those in Table 8.-40-
historicallytypical ten percent of before-tax investment returns. With the
addition of interest deductions the value of being taxable increases, par-
ticularly as inflation rises. The use of partial debt-finance lowers the
expected corporate tax bill, although its effect on total corporate and indivi-
dual tax payments is probably smaller given the individual tax advantage to
holding equity. It is of greatest benefit for taxable firms. The effective tax
rate reductions for equipment and structures are 15.0 and 12.5 percentage points
for the firm with no losses in the last two years, compared to 10.0 and 10.9
points for the firm with two consecutive loss years and 16.6 and 14.1 points for
the firm facing perfect loss-offsets. Overall, the addition of this moderate
level of interest expense amplifies the advantage of being taxable. The effect-
ive tax rates on structures are very close while taxable firms enjoy a substan-
tial advantage in equipment. Taking interest deductions into account, being
nontaxable probably discourages marginal investment and induces a shift away
from equipment investment.
The last two sets of calculations in Table 9 consider the impact of
altering the tax provisions regarding the loss carryforwards themselves. The
first set estimates the effect of permitting unlimited car.ryforwards, while the
second examines the impact of eliminating the ability to carry losses back. Our
earlier calculations suggested that increasing the time limit on the use of tax
losses from five to fifteen years in 1981 substantially increased the expected
present value of a dollar of loss carryforwards. Extending the limit beyond
fifteen years appears to be less important. For taxable firms, the effective
tax rates on both equipment and structures are only changed in the second deci-
mal place, and for equipment, there is a small (0.8 percent) change in the-41-
effective tax rate for non-taxable firms, as a result ofallowing unlimited
carryforwards. Similarly, disallowing carrybacks has arelatively small impact.
The largest change in an effective tax rate is forstructures, where the ETR on
a nontaxable firm rises 1.6 percent and that for a taxable firmincreases 1.2
percent. Both types of firms experience smaller effects on theequipment effec-
tive tax rate. Structures are more affected becausethe chance of a firm having
an opportunity to use a loss carryback provision issubstantially greater due to
the asset's longer life.
The pattern of ETR changes associated withcarryback and carryforward
reforms underscores the interaction between theseprovisions. Eliminating
carrybacks raises the effective tax rate on all assetsexcept equipment invest-
ment by taxable firms, where the ETR declines.Equipment investments initially
had a negative effective tax rate, and the ETR becomesmore negative. All of
the other asset/firm status combinations hadpositive ETRs, and they become more
positive. This is because eliminating carrybacks raises the shadowcost of tax
payments and lowers the the shadow value of tax benefits. Whencarrybacks are
permitted, the firm's shadow cost of a tax payment is less than theactual
payment because it may be used to carryback future losses. Eliminatingcarry-
backs removes this option, and thereby raises thepresent value of the tax
payments for all assets with initial positive tax rates. Since taxpayments are
now more costly, those assets with mostly positive taxpayments are reduced in
value. By comparison, the value of those assets with nettax benefits (i.e.,
equipment purchased by a currently taxable firm) increases, because the shadow
value of receiving a tax deduction has also increased. Thisreduces still
further the negative effective tax rates.-42-
Allowing for unlimited carryforwards has no noticeable effect on any effec-
tive tax rate except that for nontaxable firms investing in equipment, where the
effective tax rate rises. This occurs even though the firm carrying losses for-
ward will be better off with an extension of the time limit, because positive
marginal tax payments that otherwise might have been entirely avoided may now
have to be made.
The results in this section have all been derived using the average tran-
sition probabilities estimated over the 1968-1984 period. These suffer from
several drawbacks, as suggested in the second section. Table 10 reports the
baseline current-law effective tax rate and sensitivity calculations using the
second s well as the sen-order transition probabilities estimated for the
1981-1984 period. The results are strikingly similar to those in Table 9, with
the one significant exception being the effective tax rate on structures for
firms with tax loss carryforwards. Using the full sample probabilities, this
effective tax rate was 39.2 percent. In Table 10, it is only 24.2 percent. The
difference arises because using the post-1981 transition probabilities, a firm
with two years of loss carryforward has a greater chance (.913) of remaining in
the untaxed state than under the full sample probabilities (.830). This
increases the persistence of tax loss carryforwards and raises the probability
that a loss firm will defer the tax payments on the structure's earnings, as
well as the (less important) depreciation allowances. This deferral reduces the
effective tax rate.
There are other minor differences between the results in Tables 9 and 10.
Using the post-1981 probabilities, the equipment ETR for a firm with tax loss
carryforwards is 8.3 percent, compared with 15.0 percent if the full—sample-43-
TABLE 10: SENSITIVITY OF EFFECTIVE TAX RATES TO ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS
Estimates Using Transition Probabilities from 1981-1984 Annual Report Data
Firm with Loss Firm which is Hypothetical
Carryforward in Taxable in Firm Facing Per-
Assumption Periods t & t-1 Periods t & t-]. fect Loss Offset
General Industrial Equipment
Base Case 8.3 -6.7 0.8
Inflation =.10 12.5 8.3 19.2
Real Interest
Payments =.10* 3.3 -20.8 -15.8
(Pretax Returns)
Unlimited
Carryforwards 7.5 -6.7 0.8
Elimination of
Carrybacks 108 -8.3 0.8
Industrial Buildings
Base Case 24.2 40.0 48.3
Inflation =.10 25.0 50.0 60.8
Real Interest
Payments =.10* 18.3 28.3 34.2
(Pretax Returns)
Unlimited
Carryforwards 25.0 40.0 48.3
Elimination of
Carrybacks 30.0 40.0 48.3
Notes: Maintained assumptions are the same as those in Table 9 except that we
use the transition probabilities from Table 4 rather than those from
Table 5.-44--
probabilitiesdescribe the transition matrix. The loss carryforward firms are
also much less sensitive to the inflation rate under the post-1981 probabili-
ties, primarily because the chance that these firms will ever return to taxable
status is lower and so the present value of the tax allowances, the part of the
calculation which can be sensitive to the inflation rate, is much reduced.-45-
5.Conclusions
This paper has explored the recent incidence of tax loss carryforwards
amongst nonfinancial corporations. Although fifteen percent of all firms report
loss carryforwards, when weighted by market value, these firms account for only
about three percent of the corporate sector. There are, however, some
industries in which losses are being carried forward by a significant minority
of firms; in these industries, current loss offset restrictions may have a
significant effect on corporate tax incentives.
A firm's current tax status is a key determinant of its investment incen-
tives. For firms with tax loss carryforwards, effective tax rates on plant and
equipment may be significantly different from those for taxable firms which are
able to utilize tax deductions as they accrue. For equipment investments under
present law, taxable firms face lower effective tax rates than do firms with
loss carryforwards. The opposite is true for structures. These findings,
coupled with the concentration of losses in some industries, suggest that pre-
vious attempts to estimate interindustry differences in effective tax rates
neglect an important source of tax rate variation. The differences between
firms in the same industry, depending on their current tax status, may be even
more substantial.
Our calculations may understate the economic importance of tax loss carry-
forwards for several reasons. First, we have modelled the incentive effects
assuming that all firms face the economy-wide probabilities of transiting bet-
ween taxable and non-taxable states. If some firms have precise knowledge about
the pattern of tax liabilities they are likely to face, this may induce much-46-
larger swings in their investment and financial behavior as they take advantage
of intertemporal changes in tax rules. Second, our calculations of the inci-
dence of loss carryforwards may not reflect the steady state to which the eco-
nomy will move if the post-1981 depreciation scheduleremains in effect. Since
the presence of highly accelerated depreciation allowances increases the chance
that firms will generate tax losses, there may be long-term shifts in the frac-
tions of taxable and non-taxable firms which cannot yet be detected.
Finally, data limitations preclude us from considering firms with tax cred-
it carryforwards. Although many of the loss carryforward firms in our sample
also report either investment or foreign tax credit carryforwards, there may
also be substantial numbers of firms with credit carryforwards but no loss
carryforwards. For these firms, the marginal tax rate on additional income may
be substantially different from the statutory marginal tax rates. By omitting
these firms we understate the importance of firms whose marginal tax rates
deviate from statutory values. If the stochastic process governing transitions
into and out of credit carryforward status is similar to that for tax loss
carryforward status, however, our effective tax rate analyses may still describe
the incentives facing these firms.
Our effective tax rate calculations embody a number of strong assumptions
about the stochastic process determining firms' tax status. In particular, we
maintain the fiction that firms face identical, time-invariant, exogenous proba-
bilities of moving into and out of periods during which tax losses are carried
forward. Each of these assumptions is unrealistic, and could usefully be
relaxed in future work. Perhaps the most intriguing direction for future work
concerns the endogeneity of a firm's tax status. There are a wide range of cor--.47 -
porateactions which affect marginal tax rates, ranging from the traditional
investment and financing choices (see Cooper and Franks (1983) and Auerbach
(1986)) to less-frequently-analyzed accounting choices (see Watts and Zimmerman
(1986)). We know relatively little about what firms do in both the real and
financial domains in order to alter their tax status. The potential response of
these corporate decisions are however fundamental for analyzing the incentive
effects of the corporate tax.
The substantial differences across firms in expected future tax status may
provide a useful source of variation which can be used to study how taxes affect
financing and investment decisions. If the magnitude of debt tax shields are an
important influence on firms' capital structure as for example in DeAngelo and
Nasulis (1980), then we should observe different borrowing policies from firms
with substantial tax loss carryforwards and those which have large accumulated
potential carrybacks and are currently taxable. The latter has a larger tax
incentive for borrowing than the former, and this may yield testable predictions
of how taxes affect financing choices.-48-
Footnotes
1. Cordes and Sheffrin (1983) calculate marginal tax rates using corporate
taxreturndata but they assume that firms cannot carry back either losses or
credits. This biases their findings toward the result that many firms face tax
rates below the statutory maximum.
2. For an excellent summary of the recent debate surrounding average tax
rates on large corporations, see the series of essays in Tax Notes 9 December
1985. The claim that sizable numbers of large corporations pay no tax is due to
McIntyre and Folen (1984) and McIntyre and Wilhelm (1986). Their calculations
are based on the ratio of current tax payments to earnings, which bears no
necessary relation to the firm's marginal tax status.
3. The extent to which firms can claim investment tax credits, foreign tax
credits, R&D credits, and a number of other credits depends upon their taxable
income. The ITC, for example, is limited to $25,000 + .90*max[0,Tax-25,000].
Additional taxable earnings for a firm bound by this constraint would raise
tax liability by only .10*T, where T is the statutory tax rate.
4. Cordes and Sheffrin (1983) were affiliated with the Office of Tax
Analysis when they used the Treasury Corporate Tax Model to calculate the
distribution of corporate marginal tax rates.
5. We also tried to find examples of loss carryforward firms which did not
appear in the COMPUSTAT sample. For example, we examined the 50firms with the
smallest current tax payments in McIntyre and Folen (1984) and found no cases of
firms with loss carryforwards which were not in our sample.
6. Stickney, Weil, and Wolfson (1983) provide a detailed analysis of one
firm, General Electric's, accounting for its financial subsidiary.
7. It is difficult to gauge the importance of omitting the financial sub-
sidiaries of some firms. We studied the published financial statement of
several large financial subsidiaries, those of General Motors, Chrysler, General
Electric, Ford, and Westinghouse, and in no case did we find evidence of tax
loss carryforwards in the subsidiary; this suggests the biases from annual
reports which exclude these subsidiaries may not be too severe.
8. Although in principle we could model firm heterogeneity and estimate
separate transition probabilities for firms with similar characteristics, the
sparseness of some off-diagonal cells in our transition matrices suggeststhat
it would be difficult to obtain precise estimates. For example, there are
only 14 firms which make the Taxable-Loss Carryforward-Taxable transition in
1983-1984, and only 20 firms in the Loss Carryforward-Taxable-Taxable cell.
Another possibility is using a mover-stayer model to describe the data, allowing
some firms to be "stayers" in the taxable state. This might be explored in
future work.
9. The steady state probabilities are defined as follows: q =-49-.
ri *t1—r\/r = (1 = + /11.r.' + I1—r and 'LT 'I'TLTIr'LLT"LI '1TL IL "LTT'
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10. The transition probabilities in this table are notdirectly comparable to
those in Table 5 for two reasons. First, in looking at COMPUSTATdata over a
period of many years, we confront the problem of missing values for thetax
loss variables. We assume (very conservatively) that allmissing values corres-
pond to taxable years; this substantially overstates the chance ofescaping from
the tax loss state. Second, the sample selectionproblem alluded to in the text
with respect to firms which merged or went bankrupt islikely to be much more
important in this analysis of transitions over a long time period than inour
previous tabulations which spanned only four years. The net effect of thisbias
is unclear.
11. An asset need not have a negative total tax liability for thisto occur.
Consider a project with negative taxable earnings in itsearly years, followed
by significant taxable income later in its life. Even if the project'stax
payments have a positive net present value, the cost of foregoing tax benefits
in the near-term may exceed the gain from postponing tax liabilitieslater in
the project.
12. Previous work treating this endogeneity has consideredonly very simple
models; see, for example, Auerbach (1986).
13. The notation L5 refers to s consecutive years of tax losscarryforwards.
14. By focusing on expected returns, we are implicitlyassuming that tax-
status risk is entirely nonsystematic. In practice, most firmsare more likely
to experience tax loss carryforwards during recessions; thisimparts a poten-
tially important systematic component to these tax streams.
15. We also truncate project returns and accrued tax liabilities afterforty years. The results are insensitive to these truncations.
16. This overstates the effect of carryforward provisions. Whena non-
taxable firm incurs a tax liability, there are two possibilitiesconcerning its
current income: it may be negative, adding to previous losses, or itmay be
positive but completely offset by previous losses. In the formercase, the
additional tax liability (if negative) will add new losses to be carriedfor-
ward. If the additional tax liability is positive, it will reduce thenew
losses carried forward. In either case, the tax liability will havea limit of
fifteen years during which it can be realized. After that time, themarginal
impact on the stock of loss carryforwards disappears. In the case where the
firm is currently offsetting some of its previous tax losses,however, the
Situation is more complicated, since the marginal impact of theaccrued tax
liabilities will be to increase or decrease the working off of old losscarry-
forwards. The marginal contribution of a new gain or loss to the tax losses
carried forward therefore has fewer than N years to expiration.
17. An additional restriction which has been changed over theyears governs
the extent to which firms can use investment tax credits to offset taxable—50-
incomebefore credits. To model this provision, we would have to modify our
analysis to include an intermediate state between taxable and nontaxable, in
which a firm pays taxes but has tax credits carried forward. Unfortunately,
because our data limitations prevent us from estimating transition probabilities
with respect to this state, we must omit it.
18. Ideally, the rate used to discount the components in the carryback shadow
price would be the after-tax rate of return for the project. However, this
would have required an iteration procedure which seemed inappropriate given the
parameter's minor role.
19. This is higher fraction initially in a taxable state than was found in
Auerbach (1983). The difference is probably due to the different specification
of the transition process.
20. We assume that structures are only depreciated once when they are pur-
chased. Gordon, Hines, and Summers (1986) conclude that "churning" is not pro-
fitable for corporations, although it may be attractive to partnerships. We
also ignore asset-related differences in leverage capacity. If structures can
carry more debt than equipment, as is commonly supposed, then loss carryforward
firms may face greater disincentives to purchasing structures than we have
reported.
21. For examples of previous calculations of industry—specific ETRs, see
Auerbach (1983), Fullerton (1985), or Fullerton and Henderson (1984).—51—
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APPENDIX: COMPUTING THE SHADOW VALUE OF TAX PAYMENTS WITH CARRYBACKS
This appendix describes our procedure for calculating the shadow value
of tax payments which arises from their possible future use in permitting loss
carrybacks. A dollar of tax payments is valuable because, according to current
law, it may be used to offset a tax loss occurring in the following threeyears.
However, its value is less than the present value of such deductions because
there is some probability that the loss that is made deductible in the next
three years would have been offset through carryforwards at some future date.
Tax losses foregone in future periods also have a shadow value because the
associated increase in taxable income will in turn lead to the possibility of
eventual carryback.
To compute the value of the carryback option, consider a taxable firm and
define TT as the expected carryback value of a one dollar tax payment made in
the second of a pair of adjacent taxable years. DefineLT in parallel fashion.
Let TL denote the present value of the future deductions foregone when a loss
is realized; it is also the present value of the tax payments which result from
a one dollar increase in taxable income for a firm which was taxable in the pre-
vious year but is currently not taxable. This follows from the fact that a
carryback is used as soon as possible, which means the first year in which there







where=(1-i)/(1+r)denotes the discount factor applied when shifting a tax
payment one year into the future. Equation (A.l) denotes the expected present—54—
value of the carrybacks associated with a one dollar tax payment. By the same
logic, we can define
(A.2) LT = + LTTTTL+PLTTPTTTPTTL)(lWTL)
for currently-taxable firms which were not taxable last year. Each of these
expressions depends upon TL' which is in turn given by
(A.3) WTL =PTLT(lVLT) +TLLLLT'LT + +
where N is the maximum number of periods for which a loss may be carried for-










Theseshadow values are used in calculating the expected present value of
tax liabilities. To account for firms' ability to carry losses back, we
multiply each of the expected tax payments generated by the no—carryback analy-
sis by either (1_vTT) or (1vLl)1 depending on the firm's tax status. When a
firm accrues a tax liability with a distribution of expected payments across—55-
many periods, the concurrent value of determines the fraction of the
expected tax payment which will be paid immediately in a state followinga
taxable year. This amount is multiplied by'TT• All of the remaining corn—
ponents associated with this accrued liability are multiplied by(1VLT), since
they occur in states where the firm will have just re—entered taxablestatus.
In the notation of section three, this implies
VLT s>t
(A.7) =t t t t + + q) S= t.
This can be substituted into equation (5) to evaluate the internalrate of
return, r, and then the effective tax rate.